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EXACTIONS, SEVERABIliTY AND TAKINGS: 
WHEN COURTS SHOULD SEVER 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDITIONS 
FROM DEVELOPMENT PERMITS 
MICHAEL T. KERSTEN* 
Due to a variety of factors in the last half-century, local govern-
ments have increasingly relied upon exactions to finance new develr 
opment projects. Develhpers and land owners have challenged these 
develhpment conditions as abuses of the police power or as violations 
of the United States Constitution ~ Equal Protection, Due Process 
and Takings Clauses. Recently, the Supreme Court has departed 
from its long tradition of deference to municipalities by heightening 
judicial scrutiny of challenged exactions. If a court finds an exac-
tion to be unconstitutiona~ the court typicaUy severs the exaction 
from the permit and enforces the remaining permit as if it were 
whole. By thus enforcing permits minus their conditions, courts air 
low develhpers to proceed unhindered and prevent municipalities 
from mitigating the harmful externalities or recouping the public 
costs resulting from develhpment. The inefficiencies and inequalities 
created by this heightened review could be mitigated by applying the 
severability doctrine established in contract and public law to the law 
of landuse exactions. Applying the severability analysis would restore 
an element of certainty to municipal regulators by reducing their in-
centive to over-regulate develhpment, and benefit both develhpers and 
municipalities by allowing a more efficient and equitable method of 
permitting develhpment. 
INTRODUCTION 
Landuse exactions, as an aspect of takings law, have become an 
increasingly debated and litigated topic in courtrooms and academic 
* Articles Editor, 1999-2000, BOSTON ColLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAw REvIEw. 
The author wishes to thank Sarah Evans and Professor Zygmunt Plater for their help in 
framing the issues in this Note. 
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circles alike.1 Generally, exactions are concessions requiring the de-
veloper or landowner to pay for or provide public facilities or ameni-
ties as a condition to a municipality's approval of a development per-
mit.2 The Supreme Court has found municipal discretion to grant or 
deny development permits to be presumptively constitutional since 
the 1926 decision of Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.' If existing 
zoning regulations do not allow developers to build as of right, devel-
opers must seek municipal approval in order to proceed with con-
struction.4 
Due to a variety of factors in the last half-century, including 
sprawling residential and commercial growth patterns and substantial 
deficits in municipal infrastructure funds, local governments have in-
creasingly relied upon exactions to finance their response to new de-
1 See Gus Bauman & William H. Ethier, Deuewpment Exactions and Impact Fees: A Survey of 
American Practices, 50 LAw & CoNTEMP. PROBS. 51, 51 (1987) (calling development exac-
tions one of the "hottest issues" in landuse law); Robert H. Freilich & Terry D. Morgan, 
Municipal Strategies for Imposing Valid Development Exactions: Responding to Nollan, in EXAC-
TIONS, IMPACT FEES AND DEDICATIONS: SHAPING LAND-USE DEVELOPMENT AND FuNDING 
INFRASTRUCTURE IN THE DOLAN ERA, 21, 21 (Robert H. Freilich & David W. Bushek eds., 
ABA, 1995) (noting the abundant commentaries on recent landuse exaction jurispru-
dence); Otto J. Hetzel & Kimberly A. Gough, Assessing the Impact of Dolan v. City of Tigard 
on Local Governments' Land-Use Powers, in TAKINGS: LAND-DEVELOPMENT CONDITIONS AND 
REGULATORY TAKINGS AFTER DoLAN AND LUCAS, 219, 219 (David L. Callies ed., ABA, 1996) 
(noting the United States Supreme Court has issued five decisions in the last seven years 
addressing landuse regulation and development). "Exaction" is used interchangeably with 
"development condition" throughout this Note to refer generally to the various landuse 
regulatory tools used by municipalities in conditioning development permits. See Vicki 
Been, "Exit" as a Constraint on Land Use Exactions: Rethinking the Unconstitutional Conditions 
Doctrine, 91 CoLUM. L. REv. 473, 478 n.29 (1991) (considering distinctions between devel-
opment conditions and exactions to be "too fine" for her purposes). 
2 See Been, supra note 1, at 478-79. "Municipality" is used interchangeably with "local 
government" throughout this Note to refer to counties, cities, towns, and villages. See itt. at 
473 n.2. While state agencies may occasionally impose exactions, the vast majority of exac-
tions are imposed by municipal governments. See itt. This Note similarly focuses on profes-
sional developers rather than ordinary landowners because most development conditions 
are imposed upon developers. See David A. Dana, Land Use Regulation in an A8lI of Heig/* 
ened Security, in 1998 ZONING AND PLANNING LAw HANDBOOK pt.4, ch. 8 at 10 n.20 (Chris-
tine Carpenter ed., 1998). The term "development permit" in this Note refers to any dis-
cretionary permit, variance, special exemption, or other governmental permission that a 
developer or landowner needs to change or expand the existing use of a property. See 
Douglas T. Kendall & James E. Ryan, Paying for the Chan8ll: Using Eminent Domain to Secure 
Exactions and Sidestep Nollan and Dolan, 81 VA. L. REv. 1801, 1802 n.4 (1995). 
s 272 U.S. 365,393,395-97 (1926) (finding it constitutional not to question wisdom of 
municipal ordinances). 
4 See Dana, supra note 2, at 11. 
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velopment projects.s Municipalities' authority for imposing exactions 
stems from their police powers,6 although the manner of or extent to 
which municipalities may impose exactions are typically governed by 
each locality's enabling statutes.' 
In response to municipalities shifting the cost of infrastructure 
from public funds to private parties, some developers and landowners 
have challenged these development conditions as abuses of the police 
power or as violations of the United States Constitution's Equal Pro-
tection, Due Process and Takings clauses.s The persistent question 
inherent in any exaction challenge is "how far is too far?"9 For most of 
this century, the judiciary has been deferential to municipalities in 
answering that question, upholding the constitutionality of munici-
palities' regulation ofland use.10 
However, beginning in the 1980s, the Supreme Court departed 
from this long tradition of deference and substantially limited mu-
nicipalities' constitutional ability to impose development conditions 
in regulating land use.ll The Court's decisions in Nollan v. California 
Coastal Commission12 and Dolan v. City of Tigardl5 created a heightened 
judicial scrutiny of development conditions that can be termed 
"nexus/rough proportionality review. "14 In both cases, the Court 
5 See, e.g., DANIEL R. MANDELKER, LAND USE LAw 398 (4th ed. 1997); Bauman Be Eth-
ier, supra note 1, at 51-52; Bernard V. Keenan, Repurt of the Subcommittee on Exactions and 
ImpactFees, 23 Uu. LAw. 627,627 (1991). 
6 See Thomas W. Ledman, Local Governmental Environmental Mitigation Fees: Development 
Exactions, TM Next Generation, 45 FLA. L. REv. 835, 842-53 (1993). 
7 See Dana, supra note 2, at 13-14. Local governments derive their police powers from 
the state through enabling legislation or the local government's comprehensive planning 
act. See Ledman, supra note 6, at 842-43. Local governments may not enact exaction ordi-
nances without this derivative police power. See id. at 843; Keenan, supra note 5, at 853-55 
(1992) (discussing successful challenges to landuse exactions based on lack of enabling 
authority). 
8 See, e.g., Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.s. 374, 382-84 Be n.5 (1994); Nollan v. Califor-
niaCoastal Comm'n, 483 U.s. 825, 827 (1987); Ledman, supra note 6, at 847-53. 
9 See Williamson County Reg'l Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 u.s. 172, 186 
(1985) (referring to regulation that "goes too far"). 
10 See, e.g., Dana, supra note 2, at 5; Deborah Rhoads, Developer Exactions and Public Deci-
sion Making in the United States and England, 11 ARIz. J. OO'L Be CoMP. L. 469, 469-70 
(1994). 
11 See, e.g., Dana, supra note 2, at 5; Rhoads, supra note 10, at 469-70. 
u See 483 U.S. at 825. 
15 See 512 U.S. at 374. 
14 Dana, supra note 2, at 5-7. The "nexus" test, created by the Supreme Court in Nolr 
lan, requires that the exaction bear a "nexus" or connection to the regulatory purpose that 
would have allowed the municipality to deny the development permit altogether. See 483 
u.s. at 837. The "rough proportionality" test examines whether an exaction burdens the 
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struck down exactions as unconstitutional takings.I5 Due to this 
heightened judicial scrutiny, municipalities take a risk in conditioning 
a development permit with exactions because if a court finds the con-
dition to be unconstitutional, the court typically severs the exaction 
from the permit and enforces the remaining permit as if it were 
whole.I6 By enforcing permits minus their conditions, courts allow 
developers to proceed unhindered and prevent municipalities from 
mitigating the harmful externalities or recouping the public costs re-
sulting from development.I7 Once the condition is severed from the 
permit, the municipality is not able to "return[] the city to the status 
quo as it existed prior to approval of the ... project," by retroactively 
denying the permit or tailoring the condition.IS 
Severing conditioned permits puts municipalities faced with un-
checked growth and its attendant consequences in an uncertain and 
troublesome situation when considering a proposed development.I9 
Placed between the rock of an infrastructure deficit and the hard 
place of a substantially limited police power, local governments may 
be more prone to refuse permission to develop altogether.20 Alterna-
tively, municipalities may decline to impose any remotely questionable 
conditions, leaving them with unmitigated development, diminished 
resources, and increased infrastructure demands.21 
developer disproportionately more than it mitigates the development's harmful impacts. 
SeeDolan, 512 U.S. at 390-91,391 n.8. 
15 SeeDolan, 512 U.S. at 394-96; Nollan, 483 U.S. at 838-39. 
16 See, e.g., Dolan, 512 U.S. at 383-86,394-96; Nollan, 483 U.S. at 838-39. 
17 See Dana, supra note 2, at 58-59 (noting that successful post-construction challenges 
to development conditions give developers the effect of unconditioned development and 
may cause municipal regulators to deny development permits altogether to avoid this 
loss). 
18 Ehrlich v. City of Culver City, 911 P.2d 429, 449 (Cal. 1996) (speaking of returning 
municipality to status quo as objective after developer challenged exaction); see, e.g., Hetzel 
& Gough, supra note 1, at 220. Municipalities may deny development altogether rather 
than risk having exactions stricken and have the development proceed unmitigated. See 
Hetzel & Gough, supra note 1, at 220. This reasoning implies that municipalities lose the 
status quo when their development conditions are stricken and the development proceeds; 
municipalities must therefore deny development from the outset because they are unable 
to return to the status quo otherwise. See id. 
19 See, e.g., Hetzel & Gough, supra note 1, at 220 (describing risk oflosing "limited re-
sources" for "m~udgments" in imposing exactions); Sant D. Starritt &John H. McClana-
han, Land-Use Planning and Takings: The Viability of Conditional Exactions to Conserve open 
space in the RDcky Mountain W~t After Dolan v. City of TIgard, 114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994), 30 
LAND & WATER L. REv. 415, 451 (1995) (noting the potential cost of imposing exactions is 
a "difficulty" which may cause municipalities to deny development permits outright). 
20 See, e.g., Dana, supra note 2, at 10; Hetzel & Gough, supra note 1, at 220. 
21 See Hetzel & Gough, supra note 1, at 220. 
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Municipal over-regulation of development benefits neither mu-
nicipalities, which face fiscal stagnation without certain, controlled 
growth-and stunted growth without infrastructure funds-nor the 
development industry, which must negotiate with a more reluctant 
municipal body and potentially have development permits denied 
until the municipality completes the necessary infrastructure.!2 By 
creating a heightened judicial scrutiny of development conditions, 
the Supreme Court discourages municipalities from engaging in the 
'\veighing of private and public interests" that the Takings Clause 
seeks to promote.2l1 Put another way, by weakening municipalities' 
ability to condition development permits, the Court effectively re-
quires municipalities "to deny development permits altogether to 
await completion of necessary public facilities rather than ... better 
accommodate commercial development projects by having each con-
tribute a share to those planned facilities. "24 
The inefficiencies and inequalities created by nexus/rough pro-
portionality review could be mitigated by applying the severability 
doctrine established in contract and public law to the law of landuse 
exactions.25 If a contract or statute contains an unconstitutional provi-
sion or illegal term, courts first determine the severability of the term 
or provision in order to decide whether the entire agreement should 
fail or the agreement should be enforced without the term or provi-
sion.26 If the term or provision is not essential to the agreement, the 
term or provision may be severed and the remaining agreement en-
forced.27 If the term or provision is essential to the agreement, it can-
not be severed and the entire agreement fails.28 A term or provision is 
essential to the agreement if the negotiating parties would not have 
22 Brief for Respondent at 19, Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994) (No. 93-
518); Arthur C. Nelson, Devewpment Impact Fees: The Next Generation, in ExACTIONS, IMPACT 
FEEs AND DEDICATIONS: SHAPING LAND-USE DEVELOPMENT AND FuNnING INFRASTRUCTURE 
IN THE DoLAN ERA, 87, 88 (Robert H. Freilich Be David W. Bushek eds., 1995). 
13 Aginsv. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 261 (1980). 
24 Brief for Respondent at 19, Dolan (No. 93-518). 
13 See Kendall Be Ryan, supra note 2, at 1832-35 (discussing detrimental effects of 
nexus/rough proportionality review on efficiency and fairness of regulating land use with 
conditioned permits); Mark L. Movsesian, Severability in Statutes and Contracts, 30 GA. L. 
REv. 41, 43-44 (1995) (discussing use of severability doctrine in contract and statutory 
contexts). Kendall and Ryan's reasoning implies that nexus/rough proportionality review 
is detrimental to municipalities because it leads to more challenged exactions, which leads 
to severed exactions and unmitigated development. See Kendall Be Ryan, supra note 2, at 
1832-35. 
16 See Movsesian, supra note 25, at 43-44. 
2'lSeeid. 
28 See id. at 48, 59. 
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approved the agreement without the term or provision.29 To be con-
sistent with established severability doctrine and to provide a more 
equitable outcome for municipalities struggling to regulate develop-
ment, courts should apply the severability analysis to unconstitutional 
conditions in development permits.50 That is, when a municipality 
approves a development permit upon a condition essential to the 
permit, and that condition is deemed unconstitutional, the entire 
permit should then faitsl If the court invalidates the entire develop-
ment permit in this manner, the developer then has the option of re-
applying to the municipality or attempting the development in an-
other community. 52 Applying severability analysis could restore an 
element of certainty to municipal regulators, reducing their incentive 
to over-regulate development by denying development permits out-
right, and benefiting both developers and municipalities with a more 
efficient and equitable method of permitting development.!I!I 
This Note suggests that the doctrine of severability should be ap-
plied in the landuse context of conditioned development permits in 
the same way courts apply it in contract and statutory contexts. Sec-
tion I examines the causes and evolution of exactions as landuse regu-
latory tools in the United States. Section II briefly discusses the Su-
preme Court cases that developed nexus/rough proportionality 
review. Section III looks at the effects of those exaction cases on cur-
rent municipal regulatory efforts. Section IV examines the severability 
doctrine as applied to contracts and statutes, and Section V argues for 
the application of the severability doctrine to development conditions 
in landuse regulation. 
29 See id. at 44. 
50 See Ehrlich v. City of Culver City, 911 P.2d 429, 449 (Cal. 1996) (noting exactions ac-
complish municipalities' objective of "escaping the narrow choice between denying [de-
veloper] his project permit altogether or subordinating legitimate public interests to ... 
development plans"); Dana, su/»"a note 2, at 10 (arguing municipalities over-regulate de-
velopment due to fear exactions will be stricken). . 
51 See Movsesian, su/»"a note 25, at 43-44 (explaining courts do not enforce contracts 
or statutes containing illegal or unconstitutional term or provision essential to overall 
agreement) . 
32 See Been, supra note 1, at 47&-78 (explaining that developers' choice of where to de-
velop causes competition among municipalities for that business); Dana, su/»"a note 2, at 
63-64 (noting most developers transact repeatedly with the same few communities). 
"See, e.g., Brief for Respondent at 19, Dolan (No. 93-518) (noting municipalities' abil-
ity to condition development with exactions facilitates commercial development); Dana, 
su/»"a note 2, at 56-59 (discussing how regulators may deny development permits outright 
due to the threat of a developer's suit challenging conditioned exactions). 
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I. THE EVOLUTION OF EXACTIONS 
"Suburbanization and sprawl are as ingrained in our national 
myth as baseball and apple pie once were. "34 
285 
From World War I to the 1950s Interstate Highway System, the 
American residential landscape has sprawled further and further from 
urban centers to vast, low-density residential developments. 55 This 
growth began prior to the 1920s when municipal governments actively 
encouraged economic development and population growth by volun-
tarily providing infrastructure, such as streets and sewer lines, to outly-
ing, undeveloped areas.ll6 Affected by this pro-growth sentiment, de-
velopers began building subdivisions in undeveloped areas, confident 
that cities and towns would provide the required "on-site infrastruc-
ture."S7 The local governments did not always pull through.sa As a re-
suit,. many recorded subdivisions lacked the improvements necessary 
to utilize all the subdivided lots. !II These underutilized lots impeded 
the efficient growth of municipalities and forced new residential de-
velopments to spread beyond the "dead land" to outlying undevel-
oped areas.to This inefficient expansion created chronic and wide-
spread tax deficiencies, further hampering efficient municipal 
development.41 
A. Land Dedications and In-Lieu Fees 
In response to these problems, the United States Department of 
Commerce promulgated a series of Standard City Planning and Zon-
ing Enabling Acts, encouraging municipalities to require the neces-
sary on-site infrastructure from developers through the adoption of 
state subdivision regulations.42 By 1958, the development of on-site 
subdivision infrastructure became a necessary condition of subdivi-
54 Robert H. Freilich & Bruce G. Peshoff, The Social Costs of spraw~ in 1998 ZONING AND 
PLANNING LAw HANDBOOK pt. 5, ch. 9, at 6 (Christine Carpenter ed., 1998). 
S/lSeeid. 
36 See Rhoads, supra note 10, at 472. 
!7Seeid. 
36 See R. Marlin Smith, From Subdivision Improvement Requirements to Community Benefit As-
sessments and Linkagrt Payments: A Brief Histury of Land Development Exactions, 50 LAw & CoN-
TEMP. PROBS. 5, 5 (1987). 
59Seeid. 
40 Id. at 5-6. 
41 Seeid. 
42 See Rhoads, supra note 10, at 472. 
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sion approval.4S Developers were initially required only to dedicate 
land, upon which the municipality would construct the required on-
site infrastructure, such as streets, sidewalks, and sewer systems.44 
Chronic lack of public funds, however, led to municipal demands that 
the developer also finance and construct the improvements.45 Courts 
generally upheld these requirements because the development cre-
ated the need for the infrastructure; moreover, the improvements di-
rectly benefited the residents of the subdivision.46 As municipal gov-
ernments gradually realized that new developments created a need 
for off-site public facilities, such as schools and parks, municipalities 
also began to impose fees in lieu of land dedication to mitigate some 
of these costs.47 
As the country's suburbanization continued into the 1980s, mul-
tiple factors strained municipalities' capacity to sustain such growth.48 
Municipalities extended services further; federal grant programs to 
state and local governments began drying up; unbridled growth in-
creased pollution, congestion, crime, and environmental degradation; 
and, the 1970s "taxpayer revolt" rejected general obligation bonds for 
capital improvements and severely restricted property tax revenue.49 
The "taxpayer revolt," caused by stagnating incomes and resentment 
of new development increasing infrastructure burdens, depressed 
municipal revenues created by property taxes.50 Federal subsidies for 
local public facilities decreased substantially.51 Compounding the 
43 See Smith, supra note 38, at 6. 
44 See Theodore C. Taub, Exactions, Linkages, and Regulatory Takings: The DeveWper's Per-
spective, in EXACTIONS, IMPACT FEEs AND DEDICATIONS: SHAPING LAND-USE DEVELOPMENT 
AND FuNDING INFRASTRUCTURE IN THE DoLAN ERA, 125, 129 (Robert H. Freilich & David 
W. Bushek eds., 1995). 
43Seeid. 
46Seeid. 
47 Seeid. 
48 See, e.g., Bauman & Ethier, supra note 1, at 51-52; Rhoads, supra note 10, at 473. 
49 See, e.g., Bauman & Ethier, supra note 1, at 51-52; Rhoads, supra note 10, at 473. As 
an example, Florida's population increased by 43.5% between 1970 and 1980, and as of 
1987 the state had an estimated deficit of $53 billion for unmet infrastructure needs. See 
Taub, supra note 44, at 126 (citing The Final &purt of the State Comprehensive Plan Committee to 
the State ofFlmida (Feb. 1987». 
50 See Nelson, supra note 22, at 88; Rhoads, supra note 10, at 473 & n.33. While prop-
erty taxes comprised nearly 43% of municipalities' general revenues nationwide in 1976, 
this percentage had fallen to 29.5% by 1986. See Rhoads, supra note 10, at 473 n.33. 
51 See Nelson, supra note 22, at 87-88. While federal grants were about 15% of local 
own-source revenue in 1979, this dropped to five percent in 1989. See id. During the same 
time period, state grants fell from 53% to 44%. See id. 
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problem was the rising cost of infrastructure construction.52 No 
longer able to finance the growth ethic, municipalities acknowledged 
that new growth must pay its own way.53 Consequently, municipalities 
began shifting infrastructure costs onto developers through various 
exactions. 54 
B. Impact Fees and Linkage Fee Programs 
In addition to the aforementioned land dedications and in-lieu 
fees, exactions come in at least two other forms: impact fees and link-
age fee programs.55 Impact fees, like in-lieu fees, require payment of 
money for capital improvements but are more versatile in that they 
are not predicated on dedication requirements and, therefore, can be 
used for a greater variety of off-site services and facilities that will be 
affected by the development.56 Linkage fee programs are an extension 
of impact fees in that while impact fees are used to mitigate develop-
ment impacts on social infrastructure, linkage fee programs promote 
social concerns or policies.57 Municipalities have justified linkage fee 
programs based on the increased burdens development imposed on 
local facilities.58 Such burdens can include the consumption of land 
available for development, reduction of land available for public 
housing, and an increase in housing prices.59 
C. Exactions: Equitable/Efficient or Extortionate? 
Developers, understandably, have responded to the evolution of 
exactions with some chagrin.60 Exactions, however, have enabled de-
velopment to occur when public costs would otherwise prohibit mu-
nicipalities from approving development permits.61 Exactions pro-
mote both efficiency and fairness by forcing developers (and their 
customers) to internalize or mitigate the harms that development 
causes, as well as by allowing municipalities to recoup some of the 
52 See Rhoads, supra note 10, at 474. While the cost of building one lane-mile of road in 
Florida in 1967 was $100,000, exclusive of right-of-way, that cost had tripled by 1986. See id. 
53 See Bauman & Ethier, supra note 1, at 52. 
54 Seeid. 
M See, e.g., Ledman, supra note 6, at 839-41; Taub, supra note 44, at 130-32. 
:56 See, e.g., Ledman, supra note 6, at 839-40; Taub, supra note 44, at 130. 
57 See, e.g., Ledman, supra note 6, at 840-41; Taub, supra note 44 at 131-32. 
58 See Ledman, supra note 6, at 841. 
59 See, e.g., Ledman, supra note 6, at 840-41; Taub, supra note 44, at 132. 
60 SeeTaub, supra note 44, at 125. 
61 See Bauman & Ethier, supra note 1, at 52; Rhoads, supra note 10, at 473-74. 
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costs of development.62 Exactions, by forcing developers to consider 
all of the costs of development, encourage developers to build 
efficiently.63 The costs of development are often legion, ranging from 
infrastructure expenses to externalities such as noise, traffic conges-
tion, and environmental degradation.64 Furthermore, in rapid growth 
areas where the municipality cannot provide sufficient public facilities 
due to cost or the high level of demand, exactions enable growth that 
otherwise might have been stalled or prohibited.65 
Exactions may also be imposed to help the community capture 
part of the profits created by the municipality'S permission to allow 
development.66 Some suspiciously view this rationale for exactions as 
wealth redistribution: the municipality is attempting to take the de-
veloper's profit and redistribute it to the general community.67 
Historically, it has been the claim of many developers, and the 
suspicion of some judges, that municipal regulators use exactions not 
to mitigate harm as much as to extort the developer.68 Interestingly 
enough, Webster's Dictionary defines "exaction" as follows: "1 a: the 
act or process of exacting . . . b: the levying or demanding of some 
benefit ... that is not lawfully or properly due: EXTORTION."69 Web-
ster's aside, this characterization of exactions has been called into 
doubt.7o First, exactions (in the form of impact fees) usually run less 
than five percent of the total sales price of a new house.7! This per-
centage hardly seems extortionate in light of the fact that real estate 
62 See Kendall & Ryan, supra note 2, at 1832; Been, supra note 1, at 482-83. 
63 See, e.g., Been, supra note 1, at 482-83; Edward]. Kaiser & Raymond]. Burby, Exac-
tions in Managing Growth: The Land-Use Planning Perspective, in PRIvATE SUPPLY OF PuBUC 
SERVICES: EVALUATION OF REAL ESTATE EXACTIONS, LINKAGE, AND ALTERNATIVE LAND 
POUCIES 113, 116 (Rachelle Alterman ed., 1988); Kendall & Ryan, supra note 2, at 1832-
34. 
64 See, e.g., Been, supra note 1, at 482; Kaiser & Burby, supra note 63, at 116; Kendall & 
Ryan, supra note 2, at 1833-34. 
65 See Been, supra note 1, at 483. 
66 See Been, supra note 1, at 483; Kendall & Ryan, supra note 2, at 1832. 
67 See Kendall & Ryan, supra note 2, at 1832. This view considers the profit as the de-
veloper's alone despite the fact that the municipality had helped to create the profit by 
allowing the development to proceed. See id. 
68 See, e.g., Collis v. City of Bloomington, 246 N.W.2d 19, 26 (Minn. 1976) (exactions 
may constitute "grand theft"); Robbins Auto Parts v. City of Laconia, 371 A.2d 1167, 1169 
(N.H. 1977) (city officials attempting to "extort" citizen by conditioning development 
permit with an exaction) . 
69 WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 790 (1986) (emphasis in origi-
nal). 
70 See Been, supra note 1, at 475-78 (fear of extortion is unfounded and the law gener-
ally supports judicial deference where market factors guide bargaining terms). 
71 See Nelson, supra note 22, at 95. 
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professionals customarily charge seven percent of a new home's sales 
price for their fee.72 Second, impact fees typically cover only twenty-
five percent of the infrastructure cost required by new development; 
the majority of the costs are paid by the municipality.7s For example, 
studies in Florida have shown that while impact fees average less than 
$3,000 per new home, the actual cost of providing infrastructure av-
erages $20,000 per new home.74 Because competition between mu-
nicipalities for development causes municipalities to deliberately un-
dercharge developers for the cost of infrastructure, the exactions 
municipalities typically impose can hardly be considered extortion-
ate.7S 
In any event, the United States Supreme Court's perspective on 
the issue has been made eleen:. The Supreme Court responded to the 
fear that exactions are extortionate in its landmark landuse decision, 
Nollan v. Califl»'nia Coastal Commission, calling the municipality's exac-
tion condition "'an out-and-out plan of extortion. "'76 And because the 
Court has the sole power to "say what the law is," exactions have be-
come suspect as a matter of general principle. 77 
II. THE NOLLAN AND DOLAN DECISIONS 
The Supreme Court's decisions in Nollan and Dolan examine the 
constitutionality of exactions imposed as conditions upon develop-
ment permits.78 In Nollan, the Nollans sought to tear down their small 
beachfront home and build a much larger beach house.79 In order to 
do so, they requested a development permit from the California 
Coastal Commission.so The Commission approved the permit on the 
condition that the Nollans grant the public an easement to cross their 
property and access the public beach beyond it.81 The Commission 
stated that the easement was necessary because the larger home 
would obstruct the public's view of the beach, thus preventing the 
72 See it!. 
73 SeeBeen, supmnote I, at 512; Nelson, supmnote 22, at 95. 
74 See Been, supra note I, at 511. 
75 See it!. at 512. 
76 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987) (quoting J.E.D. Assoc. v. Atkinson, 432 A.2d 12, 14-15 
(N.H. 1981». 
77 Marburyv. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137,177 (1803). 
78 See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 386-88 (1994); Nollan v. California Coastal 
Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 831-37 (1987). 
79 See 483 U.S. at 827-28. 
80 See it!. at 828. 
81 See it!. 
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public from realizing they could access the public portion of the 
beach.82 Assuming the purpose to be constitutional, the Court had 
difficulty believing the actual location of the easement would accom-
plish its avowed purpose.83 
In deciding the case, the Court acknowledged that the Commis-
sion could have denied the permit outright as long as such a denial 
would not have "interfered so drastically with the Nollans' use of their 
property as to constitute a taking," and furthered a legitimate state 
interest.84 The Court stated, however, that the Commission could not 
have simply acquired an easement from the Nollans without commit-
ting a taking.85 The Court then considered whether the Commission 
could constitutionally condition the development permit with an 
easement when the easement, taken by itself, would violate the Tak-
ings Clause.86 The Court reasoned that there would not be a taking as 
long as the development condition furthered the same purpose as a 
development ban.87 This is because the power to prohibit develop-
ment must include the lesser power to condition development in a 
manner serving the same end.88 However, the Court held that the ex-
action did not advance the same purpose as a development prohibi-
tion because the exaction's purpose lacked an "essential nexus" to the 
type of harm the development would cause, and therefore was "not a 
valid regulation ofland use but 'an out-and-out plan of extortion.'''89 
Although it was never explicitly stated in the Nollan opinion, the 
Supreme Court's doctrinal foundation for the nexus test is the uncon-
stitutional conditions doctrine.90 "The doctrine of unconstitutional 
82 See id. at 828-29, 835-39. 
83 See id. at 835-36, 838. The Court stated: "We find that this case does not meet even 
the most tailored standards [of a test determining how close a nexus between the condi-
tion and the burden is required]." [d. at 838. The Court continued, "It is quite impossible 
to understand how a requirement that people already on the public beaches be able to 
walk across the Nollans' property reduces any obstacles to viewing the beach created by the 
new house." [d. 
84 No/1(Jn, 483 U.S. at 836. 
85 See id. at 831. 
86 See id. at 834-37. 
87 See id. at 836-37. 
88 See id. 
89 [d. at 837 (quotingJ.E.D. Assoc. v. Atkinson, 432 A.2d 12, 14-15 (N.H. 1981». 
90 See, e.g., LAURENCE H. TluBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 598 n.18 (2d ed. 
1988); Been, supra note 1, at 474-75; Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 
llARv. L. REv. 1413, 1463-64, 1505 (1989) (interpreting No/1(Jn as an unconstitutional 
conditions case). The Supreme Court made more explicit its reliance on the unconstitu-
tional conditions doctrine in developing No/1(Jn's nexus test when deciding Dolan v. City of 
Tigard. See 512 U.S. at 385. "Under the well-settled doctrine of 'unconstitutional condi-
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conditions holds that the government may not grant a benefit on the 
condition that the beneficiary surrender a constitutional right, even if 
the government may withhold that benefit altogether. "91 The result 
was that the California Coastal Commission, and all other state and 
local government bodies, must establish an essential nexus when im-
plementing exactions.92 
Having examined the nature of the relationship between the ex-
action and the development in Nollan, the Supreme Court refined its 
analysis in Dolan v. City of Tigard by examining the degree of the exac-
tion in relation to the burden caused by the development.911 Ms. Do-
lan wished to expand her plumbing store and sought a permit to do 
so from the City of Tigard (City).94 According to the City'S zoning 
code, the City granted Dolan a conditional permit to expand in ex-
change for Dolan granting a section of her land to the City.95 The City 
planned to use part of the land as a greenway for flood control and 
part of it for pedestrian and bicycle traffic.96 Dolan objected to the 
conditions, but when she then sought a variance from the zoning 
code, the City denied her request.97 
In its analysis, the Supreme Court applied its nexus test and de-
termined that the purpose of the permit conditions fit squarely within 
the legitimate state interests of preventing increased traffic congestion 
and protecting against flooding, both interests that would have been 
served by denying the development permit.98 However, the Court 
added another step to the analysis.99 The Court said there must be a 
"rough proportionality" between the harm or costs the development 
would impose on the community and the cost imposed by the exac-
tion on the developer.1OO In a significant move, the Court shifted the 
burden for making this "individualized determination" from the 
tions,' the government may not require a person to give up a constitutional right-here 
the right to receive just compensation when property is taken for a public use-in ex-
change for a discretionary benefit conferred by the government where the benefit sought 
has little or no relationship to the property." [d. 
91 Sullivan, supra note 90, at 1415. 
112 See 483 U.S. at 836-37. 
95 SeeDolan, 512 U.S. at 374; Kendall & Ryan, supra note 2, at 1810. 
94 See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 379. 
95 See id. at 379-80. 
9S See id. at 380. 
97 See id. at 380-81. 
9S See id. at 386-88. 
99 See id. at 388-93. 
100 Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391. 
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landowner to the municipality.IOI While the City of Tigard's findings 
satisfied the nexus test, the Court said the findings were insufficient to 
show rough proportionality and therefore the permit conditions 
could not be sustained.102 
In both Nollan and Dolan, once the Supreme Court found that 
the local governments imposed unconstitutional conditions, the 
Court made no determinations regarding whether those conditions 
were severable from the permit. lOll In Nollan, the severability of the 
exaction became moot: the Nollans had, without notifying the Com-
mission, commenced and completed building their larger house 
while the Commission appealed the case to the California Court of 
Appeals.1M Thus, the outcome of the case determined only whether 
the Nollans would grant the easement: the Commission was unable to 
revoke the permit and prevent the development regardless of the ex-
action's severability or constitutionality.I05 
In Dolan, however, the exactions' severability could have been 
decided. Ms. Dolan had not yet expanded her store, so it was possible 
for a severability determination to be made.106 Mter reversing the 
Oregon Supreme Court, the Court remanded the matter for proceed-
ings consistent with the new rough proportionality test.10' The Ore-
gon Supreme Court did not take the opportunity to explore the con-
ditions' severability. lOS 
101 [d. The majority suggested in a footnote that the burden lies with the municipality 
in this case because the city's decision was adjudicative rather than legislative. See iii. at 391 
n.8. For a discussion of the practical impact of shifting the burden of proof, see Julian R. 
Kossow, Dolan v. City of Tigard, Takings Law, and the Supreme C(YUri: Throwing the BaUj (YUt 
with theFloodwater, 14 STAN. ENvrL. LJ. 215, 237-41 (1995). 
102 SeeDolan, 512 U.S. at 386-87,394-96. 
lOS See iii. at 395-96 (finding development condition unconstitutional and concluding 
opinion without mention of severability analysis); NoUan, 483 U.S. at 841 (concluding 
opinion without severability analysis after finding development condition unconstitu-
tional). 
104 See NoUan, 483 U.S. at 829-30. 
105 See iii. 
106 SeeDolan, 512 U.S. at 396; Brief for Respondent at 2, Dolan (No. 93-518) (describ-
ing Ms. Dolan's plans to expand in the future tense). 
107 SeeDolan, 512 U.S. at 396. 
108 See 877 P.2d 1201, 1201 (1994) (remanding to the City of Tigard without further 
analysis). 
2000] Landuse Exactions and Severability 293 
III. THE EFFECTS OF NOLLAN AND DOLAN ON MUNICIPAL REGULATORY 
PRACTICES 
Through the Nollan and Dolan decisions, the Supreme Court has 
forced municipalities to carry a dual burden: first, a municipality must 
prove that an exaction's purpose has an essential nexus to the type of 
harm that the development will cause; second, rough proportionality 
must exist between the exaction and the development's projected 
costs,l09 By establishing a heightened judicial scrutiny of local gov-
ernments' development conditions, the Supreme Court has 
significantly diminished municipalities' ability to use exactions as 
conditions to development permits.110 
Where a municipality could simply deny a development permit 
without running afoul of the Takings Clause, the nexus/rough pro-
portionality review will "have the unfortunate effect" of leading mu-
nicipalities to adopt "regressive and inefficient" alternatives to exac-
tions such as stricter growth controls or outright development 
prohibitions.ll1 Municipalities may over-regulate because when they 
grant conditioned permits, heightened judicial review increases the 
chance the conditions will be challenged, held unconstitutional, and 
severed from the permit, leaving development to proceed unmiti-
gated.1l2 One study has shown that in Virginia, heightened judicial 
scrutiny of landuse regulation has had a notable "chilling effect" on 
landuse regulation because local officials fear the increased likelihood 
of litigation.m "At the very least," cases like Nollan '\vill make state 
and local officials reluctant to pursue even legitimate landuse 
plans. "114 
As difficult a task as municipalities faced in conditioning permits 
after Nollan, municipalities in the post-Dolan era face even choppier 
109 Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391 (1994); Nollan v. California Coastal 
Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825,837 (1987). 
110 See Been, supra note 1, at 545; Kendall Be Ryan, supra note 2, at 1815. 
11l Laurie Reynolds, LivingWUhLand Use Exactions, 11 YALEJ. ON REG. 507, 514 (1994) 
(book review); see also Been, supra note 1, at 545; Kendall Be Ryan, supra note 2, at 1815. 
112 See Dana, supra note 2, at 58-59 (describing how post-construction challenges to 
development permits affect unconditional development and may cause municipalities to 
avoid this by denying development permits altogether). As long as courts sever unconstitu-
tional conditions from permits, leaving developers with unconditioned permits, uncondi-
tional development results whether or not developers challenge the exaction before, dur-
ing or after construction. See itt. 
115 Lynda L. Butler, State Environmental Programs: A Study in Political Influence and Regula-
toryFailure, 31 WM. Be MARy L. REv. 823, 830-31 (1990). 
114 Id. at 838. 
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regulatory waters when deciding how best to regulate land use in 
their communities.ll5 Dolan adds uncertainty to landuse regulation by 
significantly shifting caselaw to benefit property developers, thereby 
increasing the likelihood of costly litigation as well as the costs exter-
nalized when an exaction is reversed.1I6 Dolan also requires munici-
palities to incur additional costs by requiring additional studies and 
data collection validating the exactions.1l7 A further disincentive 
stems from the proposed development's infrastructure costs and the 
fact that the municipality may be forced to use its condemnation 
power to compensate the owner.lIS Additionally, there is the poten-
tially unmitigated and unsubsidized increase in noise, congestion, and 
pollution that results from development.1I9 The foregoing is indeed 
enough to produce over-regulation of new development by encourag-
ing municipalities to deny development rather than excessively, or 
even legitimately, condition the permit.120 
The uncertainty created by the nexus/rough proportionality re-
view has in part led municipalities to consider other, seemingly safer, 
alternatives to exactions.l2l For instance, one of the fastest growing 
techniques is the development agreement.l22 The development agree-
ment is "a contract between a local government and a developer set-
ting out the terms by which development will be regulated and allocat-
ing the responsibility for providing public services and infrastruc-
ture. "125 California was the first state to pass enabling legislation 
115 While Nollan was decided in 1987, and the VIrginia study was reported in 1990, the 
1994 Dolan decision increased Nollan'sjudicial scrutiny by adding the rough proportional-
ity requirement. SeeDolan, 512 U.S. at 391. 
116 SeeButler, supra note 113, at 830-34; Hetzel8c Gough, supra note 1, at 243. 
117 See 512 U.S. at 391 n.8; see also Hetzel8c Gough, supra note 1, at 243; Kossow, supra 
note 101, at 238-41. 
118 See Hetzel 8c Gough, supra note 1, at 243. 
119 SeeAginsv. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 261 n.8 (1980) (discussing the "ill effects 
of urbanization," including Mair, noise and water pollution, traffic congestion, destruction 
of scenic beauty, disturbance of the ecology and environment, hazards to geology, fire and 
flood, and other demonstrated consequences of urban sprawl;. 
120 See, e.g., Dana, supra note 2, at 10; Hetzel8c Gough, supra note 1, at 220,243. 
121 See Richard H. Cowart, Negotiating Exactions Through Development Agreements, in PRI-
VATE SUPPLY OF PuBuc SERVICES: EVALUATION OF REAL ESTATE EXACTIONS, LINKAGE, AND 
ALTERNATIVE LAND POUCIES 219,219 (Rachelle Alterman ed., 1998); Rhoads, supra note 
10, at 505. 
122 SeeCowart, supra note 121, at 219. 
WId. 
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authorizing municipalities to enter into development agreements.124 
By 1994, at least eight other states had enacted similar legislation. us 
Development agreements have become an increasingly popular 
landuse regulatory tool for some of the same reasons exactions have, 
such as the shortage of public funding and the increasingly anti-
growth sentiment of many communities.l26 The uncertainty surround-
ing exactions created by the nexus/rough proportionality review has 
spurred the use of these private contracts between municipalities and 
developers.I27 The popularity of development agreements stems from 
the fact that they are arguably more flexible and legally secure than 
exactions.I28 Development agreements add flexibility by allowing the 
parties t<t~egotiate for exactions tailored to their specific needs.I29 
In addition, development agreements are more legally secure 
than exactions for two possible reasons.I!IO First, development agree-
ments may provide security for developers if enabling statutes provide 
that such agreements are enforceable against municipalities.lSI While 
no substantial case law has developed this point, it is important to 
note that in some states subsequent legislation may void the agree-
ment where required by public health or safety, or where conditions 
substantially change.IS2 Second, development agreements provide le-
gal security for municipalities by binding the developer to the agree-
ment due to the agreement's voluntary nature.ISS The following two 
cases illustrate this point. 
A. Leroy Land Development v. Tahoe Regional Planning AgencyI34 
In this case, the developer wanted to rescind a pre-Nollan settle-
ment agreement with the local planning agency that required ofI-site 
124 See Rhoads, supra nore 10, at 506-07. 
125 See id. at 507. These stares are Arizona, Colorado, Florida, Hawaii, Louisiana, Min-
nesota, Nevada, New Jersey, and Washington. See id. 
116 See id. at 506. 
127 Seeid. 
128 SeeCowart, supranore 121, at 219-20. 
119 See id. In this way the parties are not limired by municipal ordinances that would 
apply to all similarly situared applicants. See id. 
1lI0 See id. at 220. 
UlSeeid. 
1St See John J. Delaney, Development Agreements: The &ad from Prohibition to "Let's MoM a 
Deal!", in ExACTIONS, IMPACT FEEs AND DEDICATIONS: SHAPING LAND-USE DEVELOPMENT 
AND FuNnING INFRASTRUCTURE IN TIlE DoLAN ERA, 384, 394 (Robert H. Freilich Be David 
W. Bushek eds., 1995). 
'" Seeid. at 392-93; Rhoads, supranore 10, at 509. 
154 939 F.2d 696 (9th Cir. 1991). 
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mitigation.ls5 The developer said the settlement terms violated Nolr 
lan's essential nexus standard and therefore constituted a taking.l36 
The court disagreed, holding that the agreement "cannot result in a 
'taking' because the promise was entered into voluntarily, in good 
faith and was supported by consideration. "IS7 
B. Meredith v. Talbot CountylSS 
In this case, the developer proposed entering into a development 
agreement when it appeared that the planning officer would deny full 
approval of the development permit.lS9 The development agreement 
was executed and prohibited the development of five lots of the 
twenty-eight-Iot subdivision plat in order to protect the habitat of a 
pair of bald eagles and another endangered species.l40 In return, the 
developer received immediate approval of the subdivision plat.141 Sev-
eral months after recording the plat, the developer applied for build-
ing permits to build houses on the restricted lots.I42 When the plan-
ning officer denied the request, the developer sued, claiming the 
agreement was made under duress and the denied permit constituted 
a taking of the developer's property.l4S The court granted summary 
judgment in favor of the county, stating that the agreement was "an 
informed business decision" initiated voluntarily by the developer, 
and resulted in both parties receiving certain benefits.l44 
C. The Outlook Remains Unclear 
While other cases have found similar agreements enforceable,l45 
the law surrounding development agreements is not concrete; some 
commentators suggest development agreements should be subject to 
155 See ilL at 697-98. 
156 See ilL at 698. 
157 Id. 
158 560 A.2d 599 (Md. 1989). 
159 See ilL at 600-01. 
140 Seeid. at 601-02. 
141 See ilL 
142 See ilL at 602. 
145 See ilL 
144 Meredith, 560 A.2d at 604. 
145 See, e.g., Blagden Alley Ass'n v. District of Columbia Zoning Comm'n, 590 A.2d 139 
(D.C. 1991) (holding duress is not a defense to enforcing development agreement); Sylva-
nia Elec. Prods. v. City of Newton, 183 N.E.2d 118 (Mass. 1962) (denying claims of im-
proper conditional zoning where applicant's agreement to specific use limitations was 
considered to be voluntary action). 
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the same scrutiny as are development exactions.l46 Those suspicious 
of development agreements see, among other issues, the potential for 
abuse by the municipality due to the potential for buying and selling 
development approval.14'1 Therefore, it is prudent to examine alterna-
tive approaches to development exactions. 
IV. SEVERABILITY 
As previously discussed, the difficulty facing municipalities is not 
the heightened nexus/rough proportionality review itself, but the fact 
that when the imposed exaction is stricken as unconstitutional, the 
exaction is severed from the permit,148 Severability as a concept and a 
doctrine is grounded in both law and logic,149 
In logic, when dealing with a conditional statement (if X then y), 
where the consequent statement (X being analogous to the exaction) 
is false (unconstitutional), the antecedent statement (Y being analo-
gous to the permit) is also false (fails).I50 A permit (antecedent) is 
granted upon a condition (consequent).151 Where the condition is 
negated (ruled unconstitutional), the permit (the antecedent) is also 
negated.152 In sum, where the permit is conditioned upon an exac-
tion, and the exaction fails, the rules of basic logic demand that the 
permit also fails.15S 
The doctrine of severability is well established in both contract 
and public law.l54 Courts will sever an illegal provision in an otherwise 
valid contract and enforce the remaining contract if the illegal provi-
sion is not essential to the deal as a whole.155 Likewise, courts will 
sever an unconstitutional provision in a statute and enforce the re-
mainder of the statute if the unconstitutional provision is not essential 
to the overall statute,156 To see how severability can apply to unconsti-
1~ See Rhoads, supra note 10, at 508-09. 
147 See id. 
148 See Part I, supra, and accompanying footnotes. 
149 See, e.g., Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, 480 V.S. 678, 684-85 (1987); RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 184(1) (1981); IRVING M. CoPI, SYMBOUC LoGIC 16-18,22-24 
(5th ed. 1979). 
1150 See CoPI, supra note 149, at 22-24. This basic argument form is known as Modus Tblr 
lens. See id. 
1&1 See id. 
l52Seeid. 
lMSeeid. 
154 See Movsesian, supra note 25, at 43. 
155 SeeRESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRACTS § 184(1) (1981). 
1156 See Alaska Airlines, 480 V.S. at 684-85. 
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tutional conditions in development permits, it is important to under-
stand the doctrine's reasoning and application in both contract and 
public law.157 
A. Severability in Contracts 
While courts generally do not concern themselves with the sub-
ject matter of contracts, a court may void contractual provisions that 
are illegal or contrary to public policy,158 When a contract contains an 
illegal provision among several acceptable provisions, the court may 
choose one of three courses of action: (1) rewrite the contract to 
make the terms comply with public policy (the blue-pencil rule); (2) 
hold the entire contract unenforceable; or (3) sever the illegal provi-
sion(s) and enforce the remaining contract.159 Because the blue-
pencil rule is generally limited to restrictive covenants and is subject 
to abuse,loo and because courts favor enforcing contracts as a matter 
of protecting parties' justified expectations,161 the third option, sever-
ing the illegal provision, has become the courts' favored course.162 
However, in order for the court to be able to sever the illegal pro-
vision, it must determine that the illegal provision is not essential to 
the overall agreement,16S To determine whether the provision is es-
sential, the court looks at the intent of the negotiating parties.l64 If 
the parties would have made the agreement without the illegal provi-
sion, the provision is not essential to the contract.l65 In this case the 
term can be severed and the remaining contract enforced.l66 If the 
court determines that the parties would not have made the agreement 
without the provision, then the provision is essential and will not be 
157 For a more detailed discussion of the severability doctrine, see Mark L. Movsesian's 
article, supra note 25, at 41-73. 
158 SeeFARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 5.1, at 345-48 (2d ed. 1990). 
159 See Movsesian, supra note 25, at 47. 
160 SeeFARNSWORTH, supra note 158, at 384-85. 
161 See id. at 348-50. 
162 SeeMovsesian, supra note 25, at 47. 
163 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 184(1) (1981). 
164 SeeToledo Police Patrolmen's Ass'n, Local 10 v. City of Toledo, 641 N.E.2d 799, 803 
(Ohio Ct. App. 1994), appeal denied, 639 N.E.2d 795 (Ohio 1994). 
163 See, e.g., Panasonic Co. v. Zinn, 903 F.2d 1039, 1041 (5th Cir. 1990); JOHN D. 
CAL.wAlu &JOSEPH M. ~o, TlIE LAw OF CoNTRACTS § 22-4(d), at 784 (2d ed. 1977). 
166 See, e.g., Zinn, 903 F.2d at 1041-42; yakinta County (West Valley) Fire Protection 
Dist. No. 12 v. City ofyakinta, 858 P.2d 245, 259 (Wash. 1993). 
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severed from the rest of the contract.I67 In this case the entire con-
tract fails and is unenforceable.I68 
In determining the intent of the parties, the court looks at the 
language of the contract.I69 However, even where the contract 
specifically provides a severability clause or describes certain terms as 
essential, the language alone is not necessarily dispositive.I70 Rather, 
the court will look to extrinsic evidence, such as a contract's negotiat-
ing history, to discern the intent of the parties.l7l Such extrinsic evi-
dence can overcome even the express language of a severability 
clause. 172 
B. Severability in Statutes 
Courts use the same analysis in determining the severability of 
unconstitutional statutory provisions as they do in contract law.17S In 
the mid-nineteenth century, as legislation became an increasingly 
prominent form of law, courts applied contract law's severability doc-
trine to unconstitutional provisions in statutes.I74 Just as with con-
tracts, the severability of an unconstitutional statutory provision de-
pends on the intent of the parties.I75 In the legislative context, the 
court views the legislators as the parties, and treats the statute as a 
"legislative bargain" between those parties.I76 
To determine the intent of the parties as to the importance of 
the unconstitutional provision, the courts examine both the statute's 
167 See, e.g., National Iranian Oil Co. v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 817 F.2d 326, 333-34 (5th Cir. 
1987), cere. denied, 484 U.S. 943 (1987); Zerbetz v. Alaska Energy Ctr., 708 P.2d 1270,1282-
83 (Alaska 1985). 
168 See, e.g., National Iranian 0i4 817 F.2d at 333-34; Zerbeb:., 708 P.2d at 1282-83. 
169 See Movsesian, supra note 25, at 48. 
170 Seeid. 
171 See, e.g., Eckles v. Sharman, 548 F.2d 905, 909 (lOth Cir. 1977); Toledo Police Pa-
trolmen's Ass'n, Local 10 v. City of Toledo, 641 N.E.2d 799, 803 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994), 
appeal denied, 639 N.E.2d 795 (Ohio 1994) (severing unenforceable term where contract 
contained severability clause and history of term's negotiation failed to show that term was 
consideration for other, enforceable, term). 
172 See Eckles, 548 F.2d at 907-09 (holding severability clause facilitates interpretation 
but is insufficient to direct a verdict where evidence of negotiation history calls intent of 
parties into question). 
173 See Movsesian, supra note 25, at 43. 
174 See, e.g., State ex. TeL Huston v. Commissioners of Perry County, 5 Ohio St. (1 
Critch.) 497, 507 (1856); Warren v. Mayor of Charlestown, 68 Mass. (2 Gray) 84, 90-91 
(1854); see also Movsesian, supra note 25, at 42-43. 
175 See Movsesian, supra note 25, at 58-59. 
176 Alaska Airlines, 480 U.S. at 685; see also Movsesian, supra note 25, at 58-60. 
300 Environmental Affairs [Vol. 27:279 
text and its legislative history.!77 As with contracts, while a statute's 
severability clause may create a presumption of severability,17S the 
United States Supreme Court has stated that "the ultimate determina-
tion of severability will rarely turn on the presence or absence" of a 
severability clause.179 In fact, the Supreme Court has stated that even 
the explicit language of a severability clause cannot overcome a legis-
lative history containing strong evidence that the legislature intended 
otherwise,!80 
If an examination of a statute's text and legislative history con-
vince a reviewing court that the unconstitutional provision was essen-
tial to the legislative bargain that made the statute possible, and the 
legislature would not have passed the statute without the provision, 
the court will declare the provision inseverable, and the statute then 
becomes unenforceable in its entirety. lSI If, on the other hand, the 
court finds the unconstitutional provision inessential to the overall 
statute-that the legislature would have passed the statute regardless 
of the debated provision's inclusion-the court will sever the uncon-
stitutional provision and enforce the statute's remaining provisions.lS2 
V. SEVERABILITY IN CONDITIONED DEVELOPMENT PERMITS 
By routinely severing unconstitutional exactions from develop-
ment permits and enforcing the remaining permits, courts allow de-
velopment to progress without mitigating the resulting costs suffered 
177 See Movsesian, supra note 25, at 59-60. As an example, in Alaska Airlines the Su-
preme Court determined Congress' intent concerning the severability of a statutory provi-
sion by examining both the text and the legislative history of the statute. See 480 U.S. at 
686-87. 
178 See Alaska Airlines, 480 U.S. at 686. 
179 United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 585 n.27 (1968); see also Dorchy v. Kansas, 
264 U.S. 286, 290 (1924) (describing severability clause as "merely" an "aid" in determin-
ing legislative intent, "not an inexorable command"). 
180 See Alaska Airlines, 480 U.S. at 686. 
181 See id. at 685. "[T]he unconstitutional provision must be severed unless the statute 
created in its absence is legislation that Congress would not have enacted." Id.; see, e.g., 
Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 313-16 (1936); Retirement Bd. v. Alton R.R., 295 
U.S. 330, 362 (1935). 
182 See, e.g., New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 186-87 (1992); Alaska Airlines, 480 
U.S. at 697; INSv. Chada, 462 U.S. 919, 932 (1983). Whereas the contract context provides 
the court (on occasion) with the option to rewrite the offending term, the blue-pencil rule 
does not apply in the legislative context due to the separation of powers doctrine. See Mov-
sesian, supra note 25, at 57-58. "A court has no constitutional authority to rewrite legisla-
tion." See id. 
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by the communities. ISS The local government is then left in a worse 
position than it was before the developer applied for the permit.IS4 
Assuming the municipality could have constitutionally denied the de-
velopment permit altogether, a more equitable outcome would return 
the municipality "to the status quo as it existed prior to approval of 
th . "185 e ... proJect. 
Therefore, in determining whether an unconstitutional condi-
tion should be severed from a development permit or the entire per-
mit should be unenforced, courts should follow the same severability 
analysis established in contract and public law,1s6 That is, if a condi-
tion is an essential element of a permit and is ruled unconstitutional, 
the condition is inseverable from the permit, and the entire permit 
should fail. IS? 
For purposes of a severability analysis, landuse exactions are sub-
stantially similar to agreements in contractual and statutory contexts. 
As in those contexts, the parties involved in the landuse permitting 
context-the municipality and the developer-negotiate "bargains" 
for the betterment of both parties,188 In Ehrlich v. City of Culver City, 
the Supreme Court of California described the permits in Nollan and 
Dolan as "land use 'bargains' between property owners and regulatory 
bodies .... It is in this paradigmatic permit context-where the indi-
vidual property owner-developer seeks to negotiate approval of a 
185 See Hetzel Be Gough, supra note 1, at 220. When exactions are stricken, municipali-
ties are forced to expend "limited resources to compensate for misjudgments in what was 
presumed to be a valid means of obtaining public cost contributions from private land-
owners •... " [d. 
184 See Ehrlich V. City of Culver City, 911 P.2d 429, 449 (Cal. 1996) (speaking of return-
ing municipality to status quo as objective after developer challenged exaction); see, e.g., 
Hetzel Be Gough, supra note 1, at 220. Municipalities may deny development altogether 
rather than risk having exactions stricken and the development proceed unmitigated. See 
Hetzel Be Gough, supra note I, at 220. This reasoning implies that municipalities lose the 
status quo when their development conditions are stricken and the development proceeds. 
185 Ehrlich, 911 P.2d at 449. 
186 See Kendall Be Ryan, supra note 2, at 1832-35 (discussing detrimental effects of 
nexus/rough proportionality review on efficiency and fairness of regulating land use with 
conditioned permits); Movsesian, supra note 25, at 43-44 (discussing use of severability 
doctrine in contract and statutory contexts). Kendall and Ryan's reasoning implies that 
nexus/rough proportionality review is detrimental to municipalities because it leads to 
more challenged exactions, which leads to severed exactions and unmitigated develop-
ment. See Kendall Be Ryan, supra note 2, at 1032-35. 
187 See Movsesian, supra note 25, at 43-44 (discussing use of severability doctrine in 
contract and statutory contexts). 
188 SeeEhrlich, 911 P.2d at 438. 
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planned development-that the combined Nollan and Dolan test quin-
tessentially applies. "189 
However, unlike the contract and legislative contexts, courts de-
ciding development permit cases have not inquired into the intent of 
the bargaining parties to determine whether the unconstitutional 
condition is essential to the grant of the permit.l90 By severing a con-
dition that the municipality could have deemed essential to the per-
mit, courts grant developers the benefit of building projects without 
the burden of contributing toward mitigation of the impacts such pro-
jects cause.191 As a result, the municipality receives the burden of a 
new development without the benefit of mitigating compensation,192 
In the contract context, where a party has received a benefit at the 
expense of another, the burdened party may sue for unjust enrich-
ment.195 In the development permit context, the burdened munici-
pality is left without protection or recourse.l94 To protect municipali-
ties, courts should apply the full severability doctrine in the 
landuse/ development permit context. 
In applying the severability test, courts should determine whether 
the unconstitutional condition is essential to the granting of the per-
mit by looking at the intent of the parties involved.195 IT the permit's 
language or negotiating history suggests that the municipality would 
not have granted the permit without the condition, then the condi-
tion is essential to the agreement and is inseverable; thus, the entire 
permit should fail. l96 A reviewing court should sever a condition only 
where the parties' intent can be fulfilled without the unconstitutional 
189 [d. at 438 (emphasis added). 
190 See, e.g., Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994) (nowhere discussing the par-
ties' intent as to the condition's importance to the permit); Nollan v. California Coastal 
Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987) (nowhere discussing the parties' intent as to the condition's 
importance to the permit). 
191 See, e.g., Dolan, 512 U.S. at 387,393-96 (discussing the valid mitigatory purposes of 
the conditions, but striking them as unconstitutional); NoUan, 483 U.S. at 829-30,841-42 
(mentioning that the Nollans completed building the new house and striking the mitiga-
tory condition). 
192 See Rhoads, supra note 10, at 469-70 (describing burden development places on 
municipalities' infrastructure and natural resources). 
195 SeeFARNSWORTH, supra note 158, § 2.20. 
194 See, e.g., NoUan, 512 U.S. at 829-30,841-42 (striking exaction when the Nollans had 
already completed construction). 
195 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRACTS § 184(1) (1981); Movsesian, supra 
note 25, at 43-44 (discussing judicial tradition of determining severability of conditions or 
terms in contracts and statutes by examining intent of parties). 
196 See Movsesian, supra note 25, at 43-44 (determining whether conditions are essen-
tial in contracts and statutes). 
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provision(s).197 It follows that where the intent of a municipality is to 
allow development only if the developer mitigates the development's 
impact via an exaction, the condition is essential to the permit.l98 On 
the other hand, when the permit's language or negotiating history 
suggests that the municipality would have granted the permit without 
the condition, the condition is inessential to, and should be severed 
from, the permit,199 Then the resulting unconditioned permit should 
be granted to the developer.200 
A. Potential Objections to Severability of Development Conditions 
What concerns might the severability doctrine cause in the de-
velopment permit context? If courts were to examine the severability 
of development permits, as this Note suggests, developers may under-
standably raise the objection that severability will encourage the mu-
nicipalities to overreach in imposing conditions on the development 
permits. The reasoning might go as follows: If a municipality imposes 
an unconstitutional condition, the developer can either accept the 
conditioned permit or challenge the condition in court. If the devel-
oper accepts the condition, the municipality arguably gets away with 
extortion. If the developer challenges the condition and loses at trial, 
she must accept the conditioned permit; if the developer wins at trial, 
the "essential" condition is inseverable and the entire permit fails. 
Such an application of the severability doctrine leaves the municipal-
ity in the same position as before it approved the permit. The devel-
oper, however, has spent valuable time and money, and forgone other 
opportunities in the negotiation and litigation of the permit. What 
then provides the municipality with a disincentive for overreaching? 
The developer's objection to applying the severability analysis 
lacks merit because it relies on a false dilemma: the developer is not 
limited to choosing between accepting the conditioned permit or 
197 See, e.g., St. Johns County v. Northeast Fla. Builders Ass'n, 583 So. 2d 635, 640 (Fla. 
1991) (severing unconstitutional section of ordinance when intent of ordinance will be 
unaffected); Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. Deparunent of Revenue, 455 So. 2d 311, 317 (Fla. 
1984), appeal dismissed, 474 U.S. 892 (1985) (noting severance appropriate if legislative 
intent is fulfilled and remainder of law is not rendered incomplete by severance). 
198 See Movsesian, supra note 25, at 43-44 (discussing the judicial tradition of determin-
ing severability in contracts and statutes by examining intent of the parties). 
199 See id. (noting courts will sever illegal contractual term or unconstitutional statutory 
provision where term or provision is unessential to agreement). 
200 See id. (explaining courts enforce remaining contract or statute after severing un-
constitutional term or provision). 
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challenging the condition in court.201 The developer has the third 
option of refusing the conditioned permit and building the develop-
ment elsewhere.202 This option is effective because in conditioning 
development permits with exactions, municipalities do not have a 
monopoly on development opportunities.2o~ Rather, municipalities 
operate in a development market sufficiently competitive to constrain 
them from overreaching through exactions.204 As discussed previously, 
competition in the development market forces municipalities to im-
pose exactions that recover only a fraction of the cost imposed by the 
development.205 In this competitive environment it is unlikely that a 
municipality will risk the opportunity for controlled development and 
the cost of potential litigation by intentionally imposing overreaching 
conditions on development permits.206 
Furthermore, the severability doctrine itself may serve to protect 
developers by potentially demonstrating when a municipality imposes 
an exaction for an illegitimate purpose.207 If a municipality would 
have granted a permit without a condition, then the imposed condi-
tion is probably the municipality's attempt to get something for noth-
ing-exactly the type of "extortion" with which the Supreme Court was 
concerned in Nollan.208 Severability analysis will prove this exaction to 
be inessential to the permit, in which case the courts will sever the 
exaction and enforce the resulting permit.209 
B. Severability Applied 
An example of the severability doctrine as it could be applied will 
facilitate understanding of its effect in specific circumstances. Recall 
that in Nollan, the Nollans applied for a development permit from the 
201 See Been, supra note 1, at 476, 543-45. 
202 See ill. (arguing that NoUan's heightened judicial scrutiny is unnecessary, and even 
harmful, where market forces sufficiently constrain municipal overreaching through exac-
tions). 
lOS See ill. at 476-78,511-28. 
204 See id. at 528-45. 
!OS SeeBeen, supra note 1, at 511-12; Nelson, supra note 22, at 95. 
206 See Been, supra note 1, at 511-12 (stating competition prevents municipalities from 
overreaching) . 
207 See NoUan, 483 U.S. at 837 (quoting J.E.D. Assoc. v. Atkinson, 432 A.2d 12, 14-15 
(N .H. 1981» (describing exaction imposed for illegitimate purposes as ~extortion"). 
208 See id. 
209 See Movsesian; supra note 25, at 43-44 (explaining courts sever unconstitutional 
provisions and illegal terms from statutes and contracts when provisions and terms are 
nonessential to the agreement). 
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California Coastal Commission to build a larger beach house.210 Mter 
a full public hearing, the Coastal Commission approved the permit 
with the condition requiring lateral public access to the beach beyond 
the Nollans' property.211 The Nollans filed a supplemental writ of 
mandamus requesting that the access condition be invalidated but the 
permit be issued without the condition.212 The Nollans made the re-
quired dedication on the condition they could reserve the right to 
challenge the condition in court.2l!I The Commission rejected this 
conditional acceptance, presumably because the Commission would 
deny the permit outright before approving a conditional permit 
where the landowner sought to have the condition removed.214 How-
ever, the California Superior Court found for the Nollans, severing 
the condition from the permit and allowing the Nollans to build.215 
Before the case could be heard by the state's Court of Appeal, the 
Nollans began and completed construction of their new house.216 
In examining the intent of these two parties, the resulting permit 
can hardly be characterized as an agreement. The Nollans intended 
to accept only an unconditioned permit (or a conditioned permit re-
serving a right to later legal challenge) and demonstrated this intent 
both by rejecting the conditioned permit and by building their house 
prior to the case's appellate resolution.21' The Commission intended 
to accept only a conditioned permit (without a reservation for legal 
challenge) and demonstrated this intent by rejecting the Nollans' res-
ervation offer and insisting the condition remain part of the per-
mit.218 Hence, because the permit would not have been granted with-
out the condition, the condition, or lack thereof, was an essential 
210 See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 828. Because the Nollans completed construction of their 
house prior to the litigation's outcome, an application of the severability doctrine would 
not have stopped them from building. See itt. Nonetheless, the case is still helpful in de-
termining how the Court could apply severability analysis. See itt. 
211 See itt. at 828; Appellee's Motion to Dismiss at 5, Nollan v. California Coastal 
Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987) (No. 86-133). 
212 SeeAppellee's Motion to Dismiss at 5, Nollan (No. 86-133). 
tl3 See Brief for Appellants at 5, Nollan (No. 86-133). 
214 See itt. 
215 SeeNollan, 483 U.S. 825, 829; Brief for Appellants at 10-11, Nollan (No. 86-133). 
t16 See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 829-30. 
217 See itt.; Brief for Appellants at 5, Nollan (No. 86-133). 
218 See Brief for Appellants at 5, Nollan (No. 86-133). 
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element in the permit, and when the condition was deemed unconsti-
tutional, the entire permit should have failed.219 
" CONCLUSION 
Due to the synergistic combination of increased urban sprawl, 
infrastructure deficits, limited natural resources, and an increasingly 
limited police power, municipalities need an element of certainty in 
deciding whether to grant and condition development permits.220 
Likewise, developers seeking to work in a fluctuating and highly com-
petitive market would benefit from an added measure of certainty 
when negotiating with increasingly wary municipalities.HI Courts can 
deliver this certainty by applying the severability analysis suggested by 
this Note to unconstitutional conditions in the development permit 
context. Then, when a nonessential condition is held unconstitu-
tional, the condition should be severed; if the condition is essential to 
the permit, the entire permit should fail. 
219 See Movsesian, supra note 25, at 47-50, 58-60 (noting courts do not sever essential 
unconstitutional provisions or illegal terms from statutes and contracts, but rather hold 
the entire agreement unenforceable). 
220 See, e.g., Dana, supra note 2, at 10; Hetzel Be Gough, supra note 1, at 220; Kendall Be 
Ryan, supra note 2, at 1813-15. 
221 See Brieffor Respondent at 19, Dolan (No. 93-518). 
